Fourth- and Fifth-Generation Warfare: Technology and Perceptions by Qureshi, Waseem Ahmad









   
 
 






Fourth- and Fifth-Generation Warfare: 
Technology and Perceptions 




I. FOURTH-GENERATION WARFARE (4GW).................................................190 
A. Asymmetric Fight Involving Nonstate Actors and Cultures ...........191 
B. Mercenaries and Shadow Wars .....................................................193 
C. A Battle on Moral Level and Light Infantry ...................................198 
D. Information and Technology..........................................................202 
E. Fighting 4GW ................................................................................204 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESSION AS A TOOL OF WARFARE.........................208 
III. FIFTH-GENERATION WARFARE (5GW): A BATTLE OF PERCEPTIONS ........209 
A. Fighting 5GW ................................................................................213 
IV. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................214 
ABSTRACT
The composition of warfare is changing. There is an increasing 
transformation in the traditional aspects of waging a war: conventional 
techniques of warfare are in decline and newer tactics and tools of warfare,
such as information warfare, asymmetric warfare, media propaganda, and
hybrid warfare, are filling the gap, blurring the lines between combatant
and noncombatant, and between wartime and peacetime. The basic 
framework of modern warfare was elaborated by Carl von Clausewitz in 
his magnus opus On War. He defined modern warfare between states as
*  © 2019 Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi.  Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan. 
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“a duel on larger scale,” and explained its purpose as “a continuation of
politics by other means,” with its core elements of “rationality of the state,
probability in military command, and rage of the population.” Building
on Clausewitz’s work, William S. Lind distinguished between four generations 
of warfare since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, each generation having
its own way of fighting war. This Article intends to explore Lind’s fourth-
generation warfare and Daniel H. Abbott’s fifth-generation warfare. It 
provides different interpretations of fourth-generation warfare (4GW) by
several scholars. First, it explains that 4GW is asymmetric warfare fought
by nonstate actors and by nonstate cultural groups, where asymmetric 
warfare and shadow wars are waged by nonstate actors and mercenaries 
for the political interests of aggressive states. Then, it provides additional
interpretations of 4GW, which is often understood as fighting on a moral
level employing light infantry. By contrast, other scholars believe that 4GW 
is fought with the tools of information and technology using cyberspace. 
Afterwards, this Article explores how to fight 4GW and how it is being fought. 
The Article also investigates Abbott’s fifth-generation warfare, a war of 
perceptions, and explains how to fight 5GW and how it is being fought.
Furthermore, this Article explains how technological progression is used
as a tool of modern warfare.
INTRODUCTION
The composition of warfare is changing. The traditional aspects of
waging a war are evolving: conventional techniques of warfare are in decline,
and newer tactics and tools of warfare,  such as information warfare, asymmetric 
warfare, media propaganda warfare, and hybrid warfare, are filling the 
gap, consequently blurring the lines between combatant and noncombatant, 
and between wartime and peacetime.1 The basic framework of modern
warfare was elaborated by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnus opus On 
War.2 He defined modern warfare between states as “a duel on larger scale,”
and explained its purpose as “a continuation of politics by other means,” 
with core elements of “rationality of the state, probability in military 
command, and rage of the population.”3 William S. Lind distinguished
between four generations of warfare since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
each generation representing a way of fighting war.4 Daniel H. Abbott 
1. ALBERT A. NOFI, RECENT TRENDS IN THINKING ABOUT WARFARE, 87 (2006). 
2. See Shane Deichman, Battling for Perception: Into the 5th Generation?, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF 5GW 11, 12 (Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010) (stating that the foundational theories 
of modern war are described by Carl von Clausewitz’s). 
3. Id.
4. William S. Lind, Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare, MIL. REV. 12, 12– 
13 (2004).
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continued this by propounding fifth-generation warfare as a battle of 
perceptions.5 
First-generation warfare, which was fought between 1648 and 1860, 
introduced the monopoly of a state to wage war.6 Before that, tribes and 
businesses could also wage war.7 First-generation warfare marked the culture
of order, with identifiable rules of ranks and military uniforms to counter
the increasing disorderliness in the battlefields.8 This generation of warfare
was mainly dominated by mass manpower.9 
The second generation of warfare was introduced by the French army and 
it ended with World War I.10 This generation introduced artillery, airplanes,
and heavy gunfire, while preserving the culture of order established during 
the first generation.11 Second- generation warfare soldiers were relieved of 
hand-to-hand combat and obedience guided by rules took precedence over 
self-initiatives.12 This generation of warfare was mainly dominated by
firepower.13 
The third generation, maneuver warfare, was a German product and it
was used during World War II.14 This generation of warfare introduced
the tactical warfare of surprise, applying the motto “bypassing and undermining” 
the enemy.15 In this generation, initiative was preferred to obedience guided 
by self-discipline.16 This generation of warfare was mainly dominated by
maneuver tactics of warfare.17 
Fourth-generation warfare (4GW)—which rose to prominence over the
last five to six decades—brought the most radical change since the Peace 
of Westphalia by introducing nonstate actors in warfare and by denying 
the state a monopoly.18 
5. Deichman, supra note 2, at 13. 
6. Lind, supra note 4, at 12. 
7. Id.
 8. Id.
 9. NOFI, supra note 1, at 8.
10. Id.
 11. NOFI, supra note 1, at 9.
 12. Lind, supra note 4, at 12. 
13. NOFI, supra note 1, at 8.
 14. Id. 
15. Lind, supra note 4, at 13. 
16. Id.
 17. NOFI, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
18. Lind, supra note 4, at 13. 
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Fifth-generation warfare (5GW) is the battle of perceptions and 
information.19 5GW is also a cultural and moral war, which distorts the 
perception of the masses to give a manipulated view of the world and 
politics.20 
To elaborate on these points, this Article is divided into three sections.
Part I explains 4GW. Part I is further divided into five subsections, providing 
different tools to interpret 4GW. Section A explains that 4GW is asymmetric 
warfare that involves nonstate actors and culture. Section B builds on asymmetric 
warfare and shadow wars waged by nonstate actors and mercenaries. Section 
C argues that 4GW is also fought on a moral level, often using light infantry, 
whereas Section D establishes that 4GW is fought with the tools of information
and technology using cyberspace. Section E explains how to fight in 4GW 
and how it is being fought. Part 2 explains how technological progress is
used as a tool of modern warfare, and Part 3 explores 5GW, explaining
how 5GW is a war of perspectives. Section A explains how to fight in 5GW, 
and how it is currently being fought.
I. FOURTH-GENERATION WARFARE (4GW) 
In the last five to six decades, 4GW has brought “the most radical change 
[to war] since the Peace of Westphalia” by introducing nonstate actors and 
by denying the state a monopoly in the game.21 It has involved very powerful 
nonstate groups including political parties, criminal cartels terrorists groups 
such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and revolutionary forces with a political fight 
between cultures and religions.22 Though for Lind, 4GW is limited to the
predominance of nonstate actors and asymmetric warfare tactics,23 Nofi24 
and Hammes25 include political, economic, and social strategies of war as
a part of 4GW.26 
19. Deichman, supra note 2, at 11. 
20. See Andreas Turunen, Alternative Media Ecosystem as a Fifth-Generation Warfare 
Supra-Combination, in CYBER SECURITY: POWER AND TECHNOLOGY 99, 99 (SPRINGER, 2018); 
see also Deichman, supra note 2, at 11. 
21. Lind, supra note 4, at 13. 
22. Id.
 23. Id.
 24. NOFI, supra note 1, at 8.
 25. See Thomas X. Hammes, 4GW: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths, ARMED
FORCES J., 40, 40–41 (2004); see also, THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: 
ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 2, 208 (2004). 
26. NOFI, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
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A. Asymmetric Fight Involving Nonstate Actors and Cultures 
Fourth-generation warfare is mainly dominated by the asymmetric tactic 
of using nonstate actors.27 This generation ended the state monopoly of
the use of force and included cultures, tribes, sects, and mercenaries into 
warfare, going back to pre-Westphalian era warfare.28 In 4GW, there is no 
distinction between wartime and peacetime, because nonstate actors use 
force both during war and in peacetime through asymmetric strategies, 
using mainly unlawful force and blurring the lines for the lawful use of force 
by taking refuge behind human shields and by blaming collateral damages 
on the state.29 This practice also merges combatants with noncombatants 
and vice-versa; asymmetric warfare strategies are this generation’s default
mode,30 and 4GW lasts a long time.31 Lind correctly believes that currently 
there exists no military solution to 4GW32; as Michael Howard found,
modern warfare strategy is not purely a military undertaking but instead
consists of political, social, economic, cultural, and psychological elements
and actions.33 
Protagonists of 4GW have outlined some of the major changes in how 
to fight war, but they have conveniently overstated some of its characteristics,
hindering our basic understanding of what is really occurring on the fourth-
generation battlefield.34 For instance, while Lind believes that fourth-generation 
nonstate actors are mostly Islamic—targeting American people and the 
American government35—he misses the point that Islamic radicalism and
nonstate Islamic radical military organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and Taliban, 
were introduced by the U.S. in efforts to defeat the USSR in Afghanistan.36 
27. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 2, 11. 
28. For an understanding of how the nation-state is in decline, see generally Martin
van Creveld, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
29. See generally Harold A. Gould & Franklin C. Spinney, Fourth Generation Warfare 
is Here!, SMALL WARS J. (Oct. 15, 2001), https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/4gw.htm
[https://perma.cc/HFL3-T98X].
30. Id.
 31. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 
25, at 2; see also NOFI, supra note 1, at 11. 
32. See also NOFI, supra note 1, at 22, 35. 
33. See generally Michael E. Howard, The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy, 57 
FOREIGN AFF. 974, 975–86 (1979) (discussing the importance of social cohesion in modern 
warfare strategy by highlighting the dependence on technology and its societal implications). 
34. NOFI, supra note 1, at 61. 
35. Lind, supra note 4, at 14. 
36. See generally STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA,
AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 16– 
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Likewise, the U.S. supported the rebels against Qaddafi in Libya,37 the
U.S. supported nonstate actors in Nicaragua,38 and the U.S. continues to
support and employ nonstate actors, rebels, and mercenaries against the 
disciplined forces of the Syrian government and the Assad regime.39 The
U.S. also currently fuels rebel forces in states like Venezuela40 to appease
American political efforts through this very fourth-generation tactic of warfare. 
While proponents of 4GW focus on the threat posed by nonstate actors’ 
insurgencies and rebellions against the U.S., they conveniently choose a 
small sample set that suits their narrative,41 and they disregard the fact that 
the U.S. has always supported nonstate actor insurgencies and rebellions 
all over the world to encourage regime change and to serve political 
interests42—resulting in civil and long-term wars, in destabilizing regions, 
and in disturbing the peace and security of the world. 
In fact, 4GW mainly evolved as a proxy war to circumvent the legal
prohibition on the use of force by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.43 By employing
nonstate actors, states wage political and military warfare against a host 
state without being identified as the perpetrator.44 In 4GW, during civil
wars in a host state, aggressive states provide nonstate actors in the host
state with arms, artillery, and political support.45 This Article argues that
mercenaries and rebel groups are also part of 4GW, as they are routinely 
employed by aggressive states and are provided with all sorts of political
and arms support in the battlefield. Mercenaries and rebel groups are also
17 (Penguin Books 2004); see also FERRUKH MIR, HALF TRUTH: PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN
IS KEY TO GLOBAL PEACE 402 (iUniverse, 2011).
37. Micah Zenko, The Big Lie About the Libyan War, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 22,
2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention/,
[https://perma.cc/DN3X-3XPH].
38. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 392 (June 27). 
39. Angela Dewan, US Envoy Nikki Haley Says Syria Regime Change Is Inevitable, 
CNN (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/09/middleeast/syria-missile-strike-
chemical-attack-aftermath/index.html [https://perma.cc/WUY8-CG8G]; see also Syria’s
Civil War Explained from the Beginning, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html [https://perma.cc/QPK7-G2RC].
40. PRESSTV, US Sponsoring Regime Change in Venezuela: Analyst (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/03/12/590877/US-Venezuela-Preston-Interview-
Regime-Change [https://perma.cc/D3FC-R54Z].
41. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 61. 
42. See generally COLL, supra note 36; see also Mir supra note 36; Zenko, supra
note 37; Nicar. v. U.S., Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 392; Dewan, supra note 39. 
43. AMY E. ECKERT, OUTSOURCING WAR: THE JUST WAR TRADITION IN THE AGE OF
MILITARY PRIVATIZATION 50–51(Cornell Univ. Press, 2015). 
44. Csér Orsolya, Asymmetric Warfare - The Siege of Fallujah, U. OF DEFENCE IN BRNO 
ECON. & MGMT. J.  60, 61 (2015). 
45. Dewan, supra note 39; see also Syria’s Civil War Explained from the Beginning, 
supra note 39. 
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routinely employed away from the battlefield during peacetime, in populated 
cities among civilians, to serve political interests such as regime changes, 
to start a civil or international war, to initiate an intervention in a host state,
to destabilize a region, to fight an enemy government, and to serve the political, 
monetary, and strategic interests of aggressive states.
B. Mercenaries and Shadow Wars 
Countries employ asymmetric and irregular conflict structures by employing
nonstate actors and mercenaries46 to participate in conflicts that circumvent
the responsibility of war, the laws of wars, and international humanitarian
laws.47 For instance, a party to a conflict employing nonstate actors does
not have to assess the necessary use of force, and that party can exploit 
the situation by using as much force as desired.48 Asymmetric warfare is
defined “as something done to military forces to undermine their conventional 
military strength.”49 In practical terms, aggressive states use mercenaries 
to fight a target’s military forces.50 The U.S. War College Library has produced
a well-researched bibliography on the subject of irregular warfare by
asymmetric means.51 Asymmetric warfare furthers the political objectives
of an aggressor to force its will on the target using unconventional means 
(including, but not limited to, the use of weapons of mass destruction, partisan 
raids, the use of non-traditional and inexpensive material, and suicide attacks).52 
While the use of private armies and mercenaries is nothing new, their use 
as a proxy (instead of the aggressive state being a party to the war) provides
an example of irregular and asymmetric warfare; so does the use of
cyberwarfare.53 Superpowers undertaking warfare with proxies (i.e. by 
46. ECKERT, supra note 43, at 58. 
47. Robin Geiß, Asymmetric Conflict Structures, 88(864) INT’L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 757–59 (2006). 
48. Id. 
49. M. R. Sudhir, Asymmetric War: A Conceptual Understanding, CLAWSJ. 58 (2008). 
50. See id.
 51. See generally U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE LIBRARY, IRREGULAR WARFARE: A
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2009). 
52. Orsolya, supra note 44, at 60–61. 
 53. See Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict, 158 THE
RUSI J., 40, 4–45 (2013), for and explanation of asymmetric warfare, id., and a definition 
of “cyberwarfare” as an arms-length mode of proxy war-fighting that emerged from society’s
contemporary reliance on computer networks, its difficulties of tracing the origin on the
attacks, a high degree of anonymity, attractive low costs, and the possibility of creating 
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employing nonstate actors) serve their geopolitical and geostrategic interests, 
which can also give rise to cyberwarfare54 and hybrid warfare.55 Similarly,
jihadists and terrorist organizations further their cause through propaganda in
cyberspace.56 Propaganda has long been a tool of rebellion and of insurgent 
warfare.57 Insurgency and guerilla warfare in Iraq, such as the siege of Fallujah, 
is a prime example of propaganda and asymmetric warfare in action.58 
Asymmetric warfare is an euphemism encompassing aggressors using nonstate 
actors to target vulnerable states, which produce disproportionate effects 
while avoiding direct engagement.59 Overall, the use of mercenaries, nonstate
actors, private military actors, criminal cartels, terrorist groups, organized
groups, and outsourced modern warfare is growing, challenging the fundamental 
values of the world order.60 
The U.S. employs mercenaries to fight its wars, because renting an army
is cheaper than owning one.61 Fifty percent of U.S. armed forces in Iraq
and seventy percent of U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan wereor are contracted.62 
These mercenaries are tasked with “raising armies and engaging in combat.”63 
Employing mercenaries now support multimillion-dollar corporations.64 
For instance, Erik Prince, founder of the corporation Blackwater (now merged
infrastructural damage to a foreign country of a kind that surrogate armies cannot achieve, 
id. at 43. 
54. Id. at 45. 
55. See generally FRANK G. HOFFMAN, CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
THE RISE OF HYBRID WARS (2007); see also Mumford, supra note 53. 
56. Charlie Winter &Haid Haid, Jihadist Propaganda, Offline: Strategic Communications 
in Modern Warfare, MIDDLE E. INST. POL’Y PAPER 1 (June 2018); see also Reuven Firestone, 
“Jihadism” as a New Religious Movement, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE NEW 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 263 (Olav Hammer & Mikael Rothstein eds., 2012) (defining 
“jihadism” as a term that has been constructed in Western languages to describe militant 
Islamic movements rooted in political Islam and perceived as existentially threatening to
the West).
57.  Winter & Haid, supra note 56. 
58. See Orsolya, supra note 44, at 60–61. 
59. Ajey Lele, Asymmetric Warfare: A State vs Non-State Conflict, OASIS, 20, 98
(2014).
60. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Rise of Outsourcing in Modern Warfare: 
Sovereign Power, Private Military Actors, and the Constitutive Process, 60(2) ME. L. REV. 
281, 429 (2008). 
61. SEAN MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR: VICTORY IN THE AGE OF DURABLE
DISORDER 125 (HarperCollins Publishers, 2019). 
62. Id. at 128. 
63. See id.
 64. SEAN MCFATE, THE MODERN MERCENARY: PRIVATE ARMIES AND WHAT THEY
MEAN FOR WORLD ORDER 80–81 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2014); see also Brian Wang, US
spent $250 billion on contractors from 2007-2017 andmay [sic] adopt Blackwater 2.0 plan, 
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into Constellis Holdings), encouraged the U.S. to replace all American
troops in Afghanistan with mercenaries and suggested the U.S. do that for 
all its future wars.65 Sean McFate expects that eighty to ninety percent of
combatants in future U.S. wars will be mercenary combatants.66 Exploited
mineral resources of host states (such as the oil reserves of Iraq) pay the 
wages for these mercenaries.67 However, 1.8 to 4.5 times more mercenaries
die in combat than do their military counterparts,68 and the lack of proper
training, equipment, resources, and political backing could explain these
differences in casualties. About twenty-five percent of American-employed 
mercenaries met criteria for PTSD, forty-seven percent met criteria for 
alcohol misuse, and eighteen percent met criteria for depression.69 The
data on the total casualties of mercenaries is not always kept current by
employers, and companies tend to underreport these figures.70 Keeping a
contractual army is about 10 percent to 50 percent cheaper than keeping a 
traditional army, depending on the situation.71 Moreover, keeping a mercenary 
army is free after the contract has ended, or before a contract starts, which 
is much cheaper than keeping an official army.72 The U.S. Department of
Defense spent about 250 billion dollars on mercenary contracts from 2007 
to 2017.73 For instance, the U.S. employs private military contractors,
“including Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and DynCorp.”74 Around the world 
mercenaries and private contractors are currently employed in the wars in
Syria,75 Yemen, Nigeria, Libya, and Ukraine.76 These war-profiteering 
contractors do not fight with conventional means of wars, and they can 
65. MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 129. 
66. Id.
 67. Id. at 156–57. 
68. Id. at 130. 
69. Id.
70. To learn about how mercenaries operating in Iraq lacked basic facilities such as 
medical care, see PAUL AMAR, GLOBAL SOUTH TO THE RESCUE: EMERGING HUMANITARIAN
SUPERPOWERS AND GLOBALIZING RESCUE INDUSTRIES, 46 (Routledge, 2014); see also MCFATE,
THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 130. 
71. See MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 131. 
72. Id.
 73. Wang, supra note 64. 
74. See MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 131. 
75. See generally TONY CARTALUCCI & NILE BOWIE, SUBVERTING SYRIA: HOW CIA
CONTRA GANGS AND NGOS MANUFACTURE, MISLABEL AND MARKET MASS MURDER (Progressive
Press, 2012).
76. MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 133. 
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easily outgun and outpace the opposition’s militaries.77 Terrorists also hire
mercenaries, as groups like Malhama Tactical only work for jihadi extremists.78 
Similarly to the U.S., Arab countries, Russia, NGOs,79 and multinational
companies also employ paid mercenaries and private security contractors.80 
For example, the United Arab Emirates used contracted mercenaries in
Yemen against the Houthi rebels.81 Likewise, Aegis Defense Services and 
Triple Canopy advertised their services to NGOs, and the European 
Interagency Security Forum and InterAction provide guidelines to their
member organizations about how to hire paid guns.82 Comparably, mineral 
and oil extraction companies like Freeport-McMoRan hired Triple Canopy
for protection in Indonesia; and China National Petroleum Corporation 
hired DeWe Security to protect its assets in South Sudan.83 
Weak governments with high mineral resources are prime targets for
mercenary takeovers, this is the case of Venezuela, Liberia, and Congo for 
instance.84 Mercenaries are capable of taking over a state by hijacking 
separatist movements, staging coups d’état, declaring themselves presidents
—like the Houthis did in Yemen.85 Mercenaries fuel rebellions and acquire
mineral resources like oil and gas, which they later sell on the black market
through shell companies to generate income and profit.86 Additionally, the 
deep state—the intelligence, judiciary, and military establishment—has 
77. MCFATE, THE MODERN MERCENARY, supra note 64, at 166; see also MCFATE,
THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 132–33. 
78. See MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 135. 
79. Id. at 136. 
80. Id.
 81. Zvi Bar’el, Yemen’s War Is a Mercenary Heaven. Are Israelis Reaping the
Profits?: The Privatization of the War in Yemen Has Entered a New Stage, HAARETZ (Feb.
17, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/premium-yemen-s-war-is-a-mercenary-heaven-are-
israelis-reaping-the-profits-1.6938348 [https://perma.cc/SV7D-YAK5]; see also ERITREA, 
UAE Deploys Mercenaries in Yemen, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2015),  http://country.eiu.com/
article.aspx?articleid=733721457&Country=Eritrea&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecas
t&subsubtopic=International+relations [https://perma.cc/7KG9-97UR]; Tom Stevenson,
Saudi’s Coalition in Yemen: Militias and Mercenaries Backed by Western Firepower, 
MIDDLE EAST EYE (Mar. 28, 2019),  https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudis-coalition-
yemen-militias-and-mercenaries-backed-western-firepower [https://perma.cc/4ZW9-TTZ4]. 
82. See MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 131. 
83. See id.
 84. MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 156–57. 
85. Bearing the Brunt of War in Yemen: International Law Violations and their 
Impact on the Civilian Population, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 3 (July 2018), 
http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Yemen-War-impact-on-populations-
Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2018-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EZE-JGNU]; see also MCFATE, 
supra note 61, at 156–57. 
86. MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 136. 
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gone rogue and works against the interests of its own state.87 In doing so,
mercenaries are empowered to fashion coups and rebellions in a host state.88 
International law prohibits states from using force to fuel rebellions,
insurgencies, or to otherwise push nonstate actors into conflict.89 The landmark 
Nicaragua case held that aggression and use of force include supplying 
arms and financial support to insurgents and rebels working against the 
state.90 Interpreting Nicaragua, this Article argues that an aggressor state
can be held accountable for the unlawful use of force and intervention in 
the host state if it can be established that the nonstate actors are under the 
direct control of the aggressor.91 Therefore, in the mercenary world of hired 
guns, the rule is to leave no fingerprints (i.e. to ensure that nothing connects
the events to the state-aggressor).92 Aggressive states circumvent the 
prohibition on using force by employing hired guns to do the “dirty work” 
and to leave no fingerprints. Consequently, the aggressor avoids liability
by avoiding direct engagement,93 thus circumventing international law
prohibiting using force.94 Proponents of the use of nonstate actors as
mercenaries in conflicts argue that legality is irrelevant because international 
policing and judicial system are virtually nonexistent.95 
The biggest issue with circumvention is that nonstate actors and mercenaries 
are indistinguishable from terrorists. Terrorists use force against the state
to create terror for political purposes.96 Likewise, mercenaries use force 
against the state and against its people for the political interests of the
aggressors, often to gain financial or political power.97 Both uses of force 
create chaos and compromise the peace and security of the region.98 
Furthermore, a successful coup to change the regime often creates a political
vacuum, which leaves an opportunity to be filled by terrorists.99 Therefore, 
87. See id.
 88. Id. at 156–57. 
89. Id. 
90.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 139. 
91. Id.
 92. MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 115. 
93. Lele, supra note 59, at 98. 
94. Geiß, supra note 47. 
95. MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF WAR, supra note 61, at 139. 
96. See, e.g., Winter & Haid, supra note 56, at 2–3. 
97. See id.
 98. See id.
99.   Jonathan Marcus, Yemen Crises: Power Vacuum Puts Future into Peril, BBC
(Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31002679 [https://perma.cc/ 
9UBR-SMBL]; Alex Kane, Terrorism Inevitably Fills Northern Ireland’s Power Vacuum,
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arming and supporting mercenaries in a host state can increase and support 
terrorism in the host state. In fact, most arms sent by aggressors to the hired 
guns on the battlefield end up in the hands of terrorist organizations.100 
But it seems as if the aggressor does not care, as long as these techniques 
serve its political or financial interests. Under the international law of force,
a host state is prohibited from arming and supporting rebels, insurgents, 
and mercenaries in aggression or force against another state.101 Yet, powerful
and aggressive states continue to disregard international law by using this 
tactic and by admitting to doing so.102 This is evidenced in several Middle
Eastern countries where rebels, insurgents, and mercenaries are routinely
supported by aggressive states—exploiting the natural resources of weak
governments and indirectly benefitting war-profiteering businesses.103 
C. A Battle on Moral Level and Light Infantry 
The revolution in 4GW is an evolution of moral, social, and political
spheres; it is a crisis of state legitimacy.104 Nonstate combatants feel they
owe more allegiance to their ideological, religious, and tribal affinities 
than they do to their state.105 Lind explains that people who were not willing
to fight for their state are now fighting for religious beliefs, and tribal
bravery.106 Lind’s generalization of the guerilla war in Iraq misses a well-
known point—most of the nonstate actors in the Middle East are fighting
to defend their sovereignty against unlawful Western interventions and they
are often fighting for the survival of their people and families.107 For many
scholars, 4GW is a war at the moral, physical, and mental levels.108 
THE IRISH TIMES (July 16, 2018, 5:39 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/terrorism-
inevitably-fills-northern-ireland-s-power-vacuum-1.3565748 [https://perma.cc/WRP7-D4H7]; 
Nada Bakos, Terrorist Group Fills Power Vacuum Among Syria Rebels, CNN (Jan. 10,
2013, 10: 44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/09/opinion/bakos-syria-al-qaeda/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SJ5-4USA]; Vladimir Putin, Middle East Power Vacuum Filled by Terrorists, 
CNBC (Sept. 28, 2015, 11:50 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2015/09/28/middle-east-
power-vacuum-filled-by-terrorists-putin.html [https://perma.cc/L66Y-U9S8]. 
100. Brian Castner, Exclusive: Tracing Isis’ Weapons Supply Chain Back to the US, 
WIRED (Dec. 12, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/terror-industrial-complex-
isis-munitions-supply-chain/?verso=true [https://perma.cc/ECZ2-5RKZ]. 
101.  Nicar. v. U.S., Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 14, 97, 101, 181.
102. Dewan, supra note 39. 
103. See, e.g., id.
104. WILLIAM S. LIND & LT. COL. GREGORY A. THIELE, 4TH GENERATION WARFARE
HANDBOOK 5 (Vox Day ed., 2015). 
105. Id.
 106. Id. at 5–6.
 107. See, e.g., Zenko, supra note 37. 
108. See LIND & THIELE, supra note 104, at 10–11. 
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Light infantry in Fourth-Generation Warfare operates at three levels:
the strategic level, the tactical level, and the operational level.109 At the
strategic level, “. . . victories are accomplished through the superior use
of all available networks to directly defeat the will of the enemy leaders.”110 
For example, the action of a single enlisted Marine may have a strategic 
effect.111 At the tactical level, “[a] Fourth-Generation conflict will usually 
have many different independent power centers not only at the grand strategic
level but down all the way to the tactical level. The game of connection 
and isolation will be central to tactics and operational art as well as to strategy
and grand strategy. It [is] . . . important to ensure that [what happens] at 
the tactical level does not alienate independent power centers . . . need[ed]
to connect . . . at the operational or strategic levels.”112 Similarly, it is crucial
to “. . . not to isolate . . . from independent power centers [needed] to connect
to tomorrow.”113 Nevertheless, “what succeeds on the tactical level can easily
be counter-productive at the operational and, especially, strategic levels.”114 
Finally, at the operational level, campaigns must structure tactical events
toward that goal.115 However, fourth-generation warfare can be difficult 
to operationalize because “. . .operational art is the art of focusing tactical
actions on enemy strategic centers of gravity, operational art becomes 
difficult or even impossible in such situations.116 
Lind noted that the Afghan Mujahideen defeated the Soviets despite the 
Soviets having superior technology because the Mujahideen center of gravity
was God and the Mujahideen had several independent power centers.117 
In such a situation, massive firepower used in de-escalation models ensures 
instant and easy victory, but inevitably results in a moral defeat.118 As a result,
the proponents of 4GW acknowledge that even a physical and mental victory
109. See HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 25, at 207–08. 
110. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 25, at 208. 
111. DRAFT: FMFM-1A, Fourth Generation War, Imperial & Royal Austro-Hungarian
Marine Corps 9 (Aug. 2009). 
note 25, at 215. 
112. Id. at 12. 
113. Id.
 114. Id. at 10. 
115. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
116.  DRAFT: FMFM-1A, supra note 111, at 11. 
117. LIND & THIELE, 4TH GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at 10–11. 
118. See id. at 51–52. 
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in this warfare still constitutes a moral defeat,119 and moral defeat is more
decisive than physical defeat,120 thus, such warfare (4GW) is morally wrong.
For instance, heavy firepower enables aggressors to physically defeat a host 
state, but collateral damage to the civilians in populated areas constitutes 
a moral defeat.121 4GW proponents mainly refer to the use of force by the
U.S. and by Israel against Muslims in weaker states, such as in Palestine.122 
Despair is a common trait among 4GW proponents about the moral defeat: 
they admit to losing this morality argument,123 but still intend to continue
4GW. For instance, Martin V. Creveld expressed that the moral victory is
unmanageable for the aggressors via conventional means- referring directly
to the conflict between Palestine and Israel, he noted that 
[t]he problem is that you cannot prove yourself against someone who is much weaker
than yourself, they are in a lose-lose situation. If you are strong and fighting the 
weak, then if you kill your opponent then you are a scoundrel. . . if you let him 
kill you, then you are an idiot. So here is a dilemma which others have suffered
before us, and for which as far as I can see there is simply no escape.124 
Creveld expressed that he is inclined to winning this warfare—even if the 
moral justification makes it complicated—by ignoring the legality and ethics
of war, and particularly by ignoring the illegal occupation.125 Therefore,
while the powerful aggressive states do possess the firepower and tactics
to win a war, they lack the moral justifications to fight it.126 This perception 
is mainly an ontological perspective of political aggressors, while entirely
missing out ontic politics or the law of using force. Similarly, Lind gives 
the example of U.S. dominance and of the conquest of Iraq: while the U.S. 
scored a technical victory by using firepower and by showing its military
superiority with advanced technology, the U.S. aggression against innocent
civilians, the humanitarian violations resulting as collateral damages, and 
the U.S. torture in Abu Gharib prison illustrate a moral defeat, outweighed 
by honor, pride, and the civilian population’s right to self-defense.127 Lind 
recommends that the U.S. capture terrorists, rather than kill them, to appear
morally right.128 He also urges the U.S. to move operating bases inside
119. See id. at 11. 
120. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 22. 
121.  Id. 
122. Id.




NOFI, supra note 1, at 23. 
25.  Id. 
126. Id. at 11–12. 
127. 
12. 
See LIND & THIELE, 4TH GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at
128. See id. at 14–15. 
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villages—putting the lives of U.S. soldiers at a higher risk—to protect 
civilians and to acquire the moral support of the host population.129 Lind 
also suggests that the U.S. should use less power and be less involved overall 
—it should operate by raids and punitive expeditions rather than by 
occupying an area or a state- while blending in with the local population, 
bribing local politicians and attacking people in shadows, thus adopting 
the Mafia model by leaving no fingerprints behind.130 Moreover, light
infantry missions131 should be preferred to reduce collateral damages, thus
allowing the infrastructure of civilian government to continue to work
peacefully.132 The U.S. still lacks the tactical repertoire and foot mobility 
of true light infantry.133 Therefore, it should train its light infantry and
focus on the areas of flexibility, free-play training, weapons proficiency,
stealth and stalking, survival training, physical fitness, demolitions, land 
navigation, surveillance, medical training, and arms’ support.134 Lind also
suggests that the U.S. use the local press to fight 4GW, and he recommends 
the use of both defensive and offensive press tactics.135As a defensive tactic, 
the U.S. should control the press by not airing any negative news and by 
striving to build a positive image.136 As an offensive tactic, the U.S. should 
use openness to build the credibility of news channels, and use it for deception 
only when absolutely necessary, like a last silver bullet.137 
On the other hand, Nofi critics 4GW and explains that the moral defeat
of the U.S. and of the other aggressive states mainly results from the
shortcomings of political leadership to define appropriate objectives and 
cogent, legal reasons for undertaking such warfare against any other state.138 
As a consequence, leaders fail to acquire mass population support for 
open-ended missions.139 Thus, morally or legally prohibited warfare cannot
129.  Id.
 130.  See id. at 14–15, 44, 49. 
131. DRAFT: FMFM-2 Light Infantry, Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine
Corps 6 (Sept. 2008). 
132. See LIND & THIELE, 4TH GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at
47, 112. 
133. See id. at 47. 
134. See generally DRAFT: FMFM-2 Light Infantry, supra note 131; see LIND &THIELE, 
4TH GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at 93–100. 
135. See LIND & THIELE, 4TH GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at
59–60. 
136. See id.
 137. See id.
 138. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 57. 
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achieve moral victory because the simple morality of war is not justified.140 
Nofi properly analyze that the powerful nonstate actors pose no imminent 
or tangible threat to the U.S.141 In fact, it is quite the opposite: the U.S. has
skillfully employed more nonconventional fourth-generation asymmetric142 
warfare, on most of the continents in the world, than any other country.143 
D. Information and Technology 
Growing globalization and technological developments have also backed 
more visible and dangerous platforms for nonstate actors, nonstate actors 
that in the near past were  unmanageable.144 Therefore, exploring the tactics
employed by belligerent states in this 4GW to defend themselves against
these aggressions is necessary. In describing global guerillas, John Robb 
explains how nonstate actors employ technology, globalization, vulnerability,
and media ad networks as tools to fight 4GW.145 Robb also argues that
4GW is a war that takes place in the moral sphere, with the intentions to 
destroy the moral bonds of a cohesion.146 
Some scholars consider 4GW to be primarily based upon the technological
advancement of information.147 However, some criticize that view, and 
explain that information warfare, the use intelligence, counterintelligence, 
propaganda, and deception are not new.148 These tools have been used as 
tools of aggressive warfare in the past, and continue to be used that way.149 
140. See id.
 141. See id. at 23. 
142. For examples on U.S. expenditure on mercenary contractors used in other states, 
see Wang, supra note 64. 
143. See generally NOFI, supra note 1.
 144. Id. at 3. 
145. John Robb, 4GW, GLOBAL GUERRILLAS (May 8, 2004), https://globalguerrillas. 
typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html [https://perma.cc/2XZY-3NTQ].
146. Id.
147. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 87. 
148. Fred Fuller, New Order Threat Analysis: A Literature Survey, MARINE CORPS
GAZETTE 46 (1997) (explaining that “[a]s with 4GW, the proponents of information-age
warfare sometimes play fast and loose with historical evidence. The Tofflers, among the 
principle proponents of information-age warfare, have little credibility among historians
and political scientists. A search of nearly a hundred journals in history, foreign affairs, and 
political science reveals virtually no references to either of these works, and only two reviews,
which is hardly complimentary. Of War and Anti-War, one reviewer said, this book seems 
better in the generalities than in the specifics.”); see also NOFI, supra note 1, at 62. 
149. See generally  JAMES F. DUNNIGAN & ALBERT A. NOFI, VICTORY AND DECEIT:
DECEPTION AND TRICKERY AT WAR (Author’s Choice, 2001); MICHAEL I. HANDEL, MASTERS 
OF WAR: CLASSICAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT (Frank Cass, 2001); CLIO GOES SPYING: EIGHT 
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE (Wilhelm Agrell & Bo Huldt eds., Univ. Lund,
1983); GUY HARTCUP, CAMOUFLAGE: A HISTORY OF CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION IN
WAR (David & Charles, 1979); FRANK SANTI RUSSELL, INFORMATION GATHERING IN CLASSICAL 
GREECE (Univ. Mich. Press 1999); ROSE MARY SHELDON, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN 
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For instance, Nofi explains that Hitler, Napoleon, Alexander, and Caesar 
all manipulated public perceptions and information, and they worked to
convince the opinion that they only served the good of the people and of 
the world while unleashing devastation and destruction on massive scales
at the same time.150 While other authors consider wars of perception to be
5GW, due to increased technology of cyberspace, media and social media 
presence, and due to the noticeability of these tactics of deception and
propaganda,151 Nofi argues that the only change is the advancement of
technology: deceptive and manipulative tactics of perception remain the 
same.152 For instance, Caesar and Alexander exploited public relations messages, 
Napoleon manipulated mass media prints, and Hitler influenced radio
broadcasts.153 Current technological advancements (easier access to media
blogs and Internet) make propaganda and the manipulation of facts more
easily accessible while also expanding the consequence of information warfare
operations by rendering massive damaging effects.154 
It is thus essential to know the enemy and yourself to face all challenges 
and engagements. On information warfare, Sun Tzu states “it is said that
one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in 
a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows 
himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One 
who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated.”155 
Therefore, a race for information dominance among the superpowers of the
world takes place, with an incentive to act faster, smarter, and better.156 To 
ANCIENT ROME: TRUST IN THE GODS, BUT VERIFY (Frank Cass, 2005); see also NOFI, supra
note 1, at 62. 
150. 2 MIRIAM LICHTHEIM, ANCIENT EGYPTIAN LITERATURE: THE NEW KINGDOM, 
60–72 (Univ. Cal. Press 1976) (2006); NAPOLEON ON NAPOLEON: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
THE EMPEROR (Somerset de Chair ed., 1992); see also NOFI, supra note 1, at 63. 
151. Deichman, supra note 2, at 12. 
152.  NOFI, supra note 1, at 63. 
153. 
 154. See id. at 64. 
155. See RALPH D. SAWYER, THE SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS OF ANCIENT CHINA, 162 
(WESTVIEW PRESS, 1993) (discussing Sun Tzu’s Art of War); see also DAVID S. ALBERTS
ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION AGE WARFARE, 35 (Command and Control Research
Program, Publ’n Series, 2001) (quoting Sun Tzu “Know the enemy and know yourself; in
a hundred battles you will never know peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know 
yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and 
yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”); see Nofi, supra note 1, at 64.
 156. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 64–65. 
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that end,  the major tools of data collection include mass surveillance, tapping 
phones, social media counts, and bugging smartphones.157  
E. Fighting 4GW 
From an American perspective and from 4GW proponents’ perspective, 
there is no escape from Islamist terrorists and nonstate actors who want to
dominate the world through restoring the Caliphate and forcibly converting
all non-Muslims to Islam.158 There is no way to fight them, because these 
nonstate actors have no vulnerabilities, no territorial base, and no center
of gravity to hold them.159 Killing even the most influential leaders such
as Osama bin Laden does not ensure the death of an Islamist movement.160 
In this generation of warfare, from the American perspective, enemies are
indeed radical Islamist actors such as Al-Qaeda, Daesh, ISIS, Hamas, and
Hezbollah.161 They execute global terrorist operations against the U.S. 
sovereign territory by carrying acts like the 9/11 events, by employing 
asymmetrical warfare and by blurring the differences between wartime
and peacetime, and between combatant and noncombatant.162 However, 
academics like Nofi disagree and argue that these nonstate actors do not 
pose any existential or imminent threat to the U.S. or to the Western world.163 
The main “movers and shakers” of such radical movements are mainly seeking 
material or political benefits, such as acquiring or gaining territorial control,
political presence, and monetary benefits.164 This Article contends that most
nonstate actors are mercenaries working on behalf of other states serving 
their interests or sometimes changing the regime.
From the Middle Eastern or from the Pakistani perspective, things change
dramatically because countries such as Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Yemen,
and Pakistan are the most impacted victims of 4GW conducted by the 
asymmetric use of nonstate actor force, including terrorists.165 If the enemy’s
157. See generally Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),  https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/
snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/2 [https://perma.cc/4U8C-TTFG]. 
To get a detailed explanation of how technological surveillance is used by intelligence 
agencies, see the works of Edward Snowden on the U.S.’s National Security Agency.
158. Cf. Sherifa Zuhur, A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of
Counterinsurgency, STRATEGIC STUD. INST., U.S. ARMY WAR C. 17 (2005); see also NOFI, 
supra note 1, at 85. 
159. See generally NOFI, supra note 1.
160. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 81–87. 
161. Id.
 162. See HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 25, at 151–52; NOFI, supra note 1, at 81–87. 
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ultimate goal is to convert non-Muslims to Islam and to restore the Caliphate,166 
then it does not make sense that radical Islamists carry their terrorist
attacks in Muslim-majority countries, which already follow Sharia laws. 
Why are these terrorist attacks targeting mosques (the holiest place in Islam,
considered to be the home of God)? Why do these attacks target innocent 
Muslim children in schools? What is their main purpose? Attacks on
Western military forces in the Middle East maybe fight against foreign
intervention in the Muslim world, but what about when these groups target
their own governments or innocent Muslim people in Islamic countries? 
These attacks categorically work against the interests of Islam. In these
situations, the ideological perspectives of nonstate actors’ attacks does not 
help to understand the events, whereas the materialistic167 viewpoint provide
some explanation. In fact,  most definitions of terrorism define terrorist attacks 
as political in nature.168 And the example of paid mercenaries, armed and 
monetary support provided by aggressive states to serve political interests 
and regime change, relates and applies to situations in Middle Eastern countries 
and in particular to the engagement of nonstate actors operating in Pakistan.
The rebellion in Nicaragua was fueled and armed by the U.S. against the
government.169 The rebellion in Syria is explicitly supported with finance
and arms by the U.S. in hopes of changing the Assad regime.170 Similarly,
the rebellion in Libya was fueled by Western allies against the Qaddafi
regime.171 The International Court of Justice in the landmark Nicaragua case 
categorically established that armed support to rebels in other states amounts
to aggression and constitutes an armed attack against the sovereignty of a 
host state.172 The employment of information warfare and the manipulation
of facts was also employed in the propaganda against Saddam Hussein, 
where he was accused of possessing what turned out to be nonexistent weapons 
of mass destruction, to justify the illegal intervention in Iraq.173 In the
166. Cf. Sherifa Zuhur, supra note 158; see NOFI, supra note 1, at 84–85. 
167. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 83. 
168. See generally  ALEX P. SCHMID, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM
RESEARCH (N.Y. and London: Routledge, 2011). 
169.  See generally Nicar. v. U.S.,1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14. 
170. See Dewan, supra note 39.
 171. Zenko, supra note 37. 
172. See generally Nicar. v. U.S.,1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14. 
173. See generally SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, WEAPONS OF MASS DECEPTION:
THE USES OF PROPAGANDA IN BUSH’S WAR ON IRAQ (Penguin Publishing Group 2003). 
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meantime,  the “baby killers” slogan used against the Assad regime174 and 
against Saddam Hussein175 has remained the same. Consequently, this Article
contends that developed nations employ information warfare and asymmetric 
warfare against weaker countries, for their political and monetary benefit. 
In 4GW the aggressor “turns its state enemies inward against themselves
on the moral level, making the political calculations of the mental level
irrelevant.”176 Therefore, it is crucial for Pakistan to be able to understand
these fourth- and fifth-generation warfare tactics to better defend its territories 
from unlawful intervention, propaganda, misinformation, and from exploitation
by the media, as well as from nonstate actors’ attacks. Nofi correctly noted 
that all these new ages of warfare have basic political interests and motivations, 
involving military resources, cultural understandings, soft power (information
operations), nonstate actors, facile communications, and likes of ubiquitous 
media.177 
One efficient way to fight these asymmetric tactics and terrorism through 
nonstate actors is to criminalize them and their activities instead of engaging
in state-to-state warfare, which makes it difficult to deal with prisoner of 
wars,178 or to establish that the actors are illegal combatants to whom the
law of war does not apply.179 Several European countries and Japan have
successfully fought rebellions, insurgencies, and terrorism by criminalizing 
these activities, coupled with the action of specialized law enforcement
agencies with high intelligence and military involvement. Concurrently,
the laws of these nations support military involvement to enforce laws.180 
An instructive example of such military/paramilitary intelligent operations by
rangers against terrorism is Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which successfully decreased 
terrorism in Pakistan.181 Likewise, paramilitary police forces can be trained
174. UK Newspaper Exposes Sybaritic Life of Baby-Killer Assad and His British-
Born Wife, KASHMIR NARRATOR (Apr. 18, 2018, 3:41 PM), http://kashmirnarrator.com/uk-
newspaper-exposes-sybaritic-life-of-baby-killer-assad-and-his-british-born-wife/ [https:// 
perma.cc/AE2T-ATZK]; see also Why the Syrian Regime is Killing Babies, CNN (Aug. 16,
2012, 2:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/05/31/opinion/ghitis-syria-killing-children/
index.html [https://perma.cc/2JNM-93A9].
175. Lou Marano, Propaganda: Remember the Kuwaiti Babies?, UPI (Feb. 26, 2002, 
12:38 PM) https://www.upi.com/Odd_News/2002/02/26/Propaganda-Remember-the-Kuwaiti-
babies/60841014745117/ [https://perma.cc/55GX-NNEE]; see also  TAREQ Y. ISMAEL &
ANDREW RIPPIN, ISLAM IN THE EYES OF THE WEST: IMAGES AND REALITIES IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR 36–37 (Tareq Y. Ismael & Andrew Rippin eds., 2010). 
176. Chad Kohalyk, 5GW as Netwar 2.,0 in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 30, 41(Daniel 
H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
177. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 88–89. 
178.  Id. at 91 n.149. 
179. Id. at 91 n.150. 
180. See id. at 91. 
181. Ankita Dutta & Anubha Rastogi, Rising of Pakistan’s Army, INDIA’S NAT’L. SEC.
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psychologically, politically, and socially to fight an insurgent menace.182 
For example, Italy used paramilitary police forces in the 1970s and 1980s
to restore stability against insurgents.183 By contrast, the U.S. through the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 proscribed the use of military forces to enforce 
law in the country.184 However, the increase in terrorist activities in Europe
and Pakistan suggests that no system is foolproof.185 Therefore, fighting
4GW requires not only DIME but also DIMEFILCH involvement and
capabilities: DIMEFILCH employs “diplomatic, information, military, 
economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, cultural and humanitarian
capabilities.”186 DIMEFILCH is basically a term to describe the “war effort”
while employing the full spectrum of all resources.187 Victory in this type
of warfare can be marked by the restoration of stability in the country, the 
resolution to an internal conflict, the end of a civil war, or a peace agreement.188 
But are these capabilities enough to resolve ideological or political 4GW
against nonstate actors, who are often paid mercenaries or just agents of 
chaos, designed to destabilize a region for political or financial long-term 
gains? The answer is that all the resources combined with special military 
operations targeting powerful individuals in the National Security Agency
leadership can positively diminish the enemy’s capabilities and can reduce
the threat of stability. In fighting this sort of warfare, it is important to first
understand the motives of nonstate actors, and then to understand the political
interests of the enemy in employing nonstate actors. These two factors can 
be divergent, because most of the time the agents of chaos are just pawns
in the hands of a real enemy, where the agents may not even know they are 
controlled by propaganda. This is true for most insurgencies, where the
general population takes part in the rebellion and insurgencies, not knowing 
that they are being manipulated by propaganda. This war of perception,
or the information warfare through media and social media, will be discussed 
in the next section, where changes of perceptions and propaganda are used
as a tool to fight 5GW. By contrast, in 4GW, nonstate actors (such as terrorist 
organizations) are the real point of concern, not the general public taking
182. See JOHN T. FISHEL & MAX G. MANWARING, UNCOMFORTABLE WARS REVISITED
154–55 (Univ. of Oklahoma Press: Norman 2006).
183.  Id. at 24, 147–61. 
 184. ALBERT A. NOFI, THE NAVAL MILITIA: A NEGLECTED ASSET? 42 n.97 (2007); 
see also NOFI, supra note 1, at 92. 
185. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 92.
186.  Id. at 93 n.155. 
187. Id. at 93–94. 
188. Id. at 95–96. 
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part in a rebellion against the state. In this regard, soft and hard approaches 
can diminish the support for organizations such as Al-Qaeda.189 Moreover, 
an intellectual framework is also necessary to fight 4GW to enable a state
to make sense of the relevant facts and events.190 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESSION AS A TOOL OF WARFARE
In this age of information, obsolete techniques and strategies of warfare 
such as massed armies and artilleries have become outdated, and they have
been replaced by leveraged sophisticated information.191 New weapons of
war are ultra-precise guided conventional ordnance, ubiquitous sensors, 
and stealth technology,192 where a few highly technologically advanced
fighters suffice to mount large-scale attacks.193 This change in the conduct
of warfare is marked by the introduction of new material tactics in warfare. 
For instance, improvements in computers and electronics, information,
communication, weapons, greater speed, capable sensors, rapid deployment, 
stealthier technology, fuel efficiency, enormous lethality, space-based systems,
biochemical agents, and artificial intelligence this dramatic change in the 
future of warfare.194 Michael O’Hanlon further divides the change into
four different categories: (1) systems: integration of systems, such as social, 
political, military, and economic systems; (2) dominance: technology rendering 
battle space more transparent, dominance is dominated by sophisticated
technology; (3) global reach: fast, precision-guided long-range technology;
and (4) vulnerabilities: leveraged by nonstate actors.195 Stealth technology 
capabilities, along with precision-guided weapons and rapid communication
through data transmission systems, allow a state to target critical objectives
simultaneously, creating a cascading failure of the enemy’s system, compelling 
the enemy to make a favorable political outcome short of war, and also
minimizing bloodshed.196 Ideally, the populace must be directly involved 
in understanding the threats posed by identity politics, manipulated perceptions,
189.  See id. at 97. 
190. For a framework’s recommendation, see LIND & THIELE, 4TH GENERATION WARFARE
HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at 4.
191. David S. Alberts et al., Understanding Information Age Warfare, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL RESEARCH PROGRAM (2001), http://www.dodccrp.org/
files/Alberts_UIAW.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S4G-H8CB].
192. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 13. 
193. See Alberts et al., supra note 191. 
194. Gary Chapman, An Introduction to the RMA, XV Amaldi Conference on Problems 
in Global Security, 11–13 (Helsinki, Sept. 2003); see MICHAEL O’HANLON, TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF WARFARE: UNDERSTANDING THE RMA 2–3 (2000). 
195. Chapman, supra note 194, at 7–10. 
196. See David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare, 
AEROSPACE EDUCATION FOUNDATION 11 (2001). 
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misinformation, and the rise of insurgencies to be able to defy any of these
involvements.197 
III. FIFTH-GENERATION WARFARE (5GW): A BATTLE OF PERCEPTIONS
Initially, theorists associated with fifth-generation warfare (5GW), such 
as Abbott,198 Herring,199 Safranski,200 Slog,201 and Weeks,202 attempted to 
define 5GW.203  A more thorough understanding by Slog defines 5GW as
the secret deliberative manipulation of actors, networks, institutions, states or any 
[0GW, 1GW] 2GW/3GW/4GW forces to achieve a goal or set of goals across a 
combination of socioeconomic and political domains while attempting to avoid
or minimize the retaliatory offensive or defensive actions/reactions of 2GW, 3GW,
4GW powered actors, networks, institutions, and/ or states.204 
5GW is the battle of perceptions and information.205 In 5GW, violence is 
so discreetly dispersed that the victim is not even aware that it is a victim
of war and the victim is not aware that it is losing the war.206  The secrecy 
of this warfare makes it the most dangerous warfare generation of all time.207 
This warfare hides in the background, and “the most successful [fifth-
generation] wars are wars that are never identified.”208 
5GW is also a cultural and moral war, which distorts the perception of the
masses to give a manipulated view of the world and politics.209 By contrast, 
197. Deichman, supra note 2, at 11, 12. 
198. Daniel H. Abbott, A Handbook of 5 GW, in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 1, 2 (Daniel
H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
199. Adam Herring, Working Definition, V.2.3, in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 205, 206 
(Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
200. Mark Safranski, Unto the Fifth Generation War, in  THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 
169, 169–73 (Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
201. Purples Slog, 5GW Working Definition, 0.91, in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 213, 
213 (Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
202. Curtis G. Weeks, On the Barnettian 5GW, in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 207, 207 
(Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
203. Stephen Pampinella, The Construction of 5GW, in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 47,
47 (Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
204. Purples Slog, supra note 201, at 200. 
205. Deichman, supra note 2, at 11. 
206. Daniel H. Abbott, The xGW Framework, in  THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 10, 10
(Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
207. Id. 
208. Id.
 209. Andreas Turunen, in CYBER SECURITY: POWER AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at
99. 
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4GW has mainly used asymmetric means, such as the use of nonstate actors.210 
Lind’s portrayal of 4GW in moral and cultural territory211 is somewhat 
similar to Abbott’s analysis of 5GW,212 which departs from the cultural
rage of the population as depicted in 4GW, and which considers the perception 
of the conflict’s context as a main focal point of analysis.213 The 5GW of
perception and context combines the “rage of the people” and the “rationality
of the state” to form an intended outcome of warfare, rendering military
command useless.214 
5GW exploits cultural icons and religious sentiments to defeat an
opponent.215 Any means of creating political support of the masses is a valid 
tactic, similar to other military warfare tactics, like the troop surge in Iraq.216 
Abbott argues that an enraged mob, professional soldiers, and other irregular 
means can constitute destructive forces.217 According to him,  information 
proliferation in warfare has technologically designed practices of warfare
that obviate the requirement of violence218 and the direct physical involvement 
of the aggressors; instead, the information through networks and surveillance 
manipulates and exploits the public’s general perceptions.219 Sun Tzu
defines this tactic of altering the perspectives of the world as the “acme of
skill [a victory without fighting].”220 The effectiveness of 5GW depends
on its disparity: it does not require any unity in its efforts and instead, the 
more a warfare is dispersed in its efforts, the more immune and effective
it becomes.221 Wars of perception are 5GW, with information being the
weapon, due to increased technology of cyberspace, media, social media,
he noticeability of these tactics of deception and propaganda backed by 
identity construction and misperception, and the power of shaping the will 
of the adversary.222 Since the proliferation of information decides the ultimate
victory of future wars, centricity is less effective than the absence of weak
links.223 5GW is the battle between the absolute concentration of power 
210. Id. at 100. 
211. See LIND & THIELE, 4TH GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at
4–5. 
212. Deichman, supra note 2, at 12. 
213.  Id. 
 214. Id.
 215. Id. at 13. 
216. See id. at 14. 
217. Id.
 218. Id. 
219. See id.
 220. MARK MCNEILLY, SUN TZU AND THE ART OF MODERN WARFARE 15 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2015).
221. Deichman, supra note 2, at 15. 
222. Id. at 19. 
223. Id. 
210
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(aggressor) on one end, and the absence of power on the other, and this 
battle compels the enemy to achieve the desired outcome without using 
violence.224 Information about the desired political world perspective is
entrenched through manipulating the culture at the unconscious level,
rendering it impossible for the conscious mind to even detect it and heavily 
influencing the political division to obtain the desired outcomes.225 
Adversaries are powerless to defend themselves against this infiltration of 
perspectives, and if they understand this change and infiltration, they will
often mistake the aggressor’s true political motivation with distorted
perceptions and with the manipulated information of diplomacy and 
propaganda.226 In effective 5GW, the embedded influence of perspective
is harmonized with violence.227 This  warfare of perspective makes the fifth 
generation “an influence, an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without
front and back, drifting about like a gas.”228 This is a kind of silent war, a “war 
where the war and political desires are visible but the combatants and the 
strategic forms of power used in the war are invisible, [not truly energetic] 
and lean towards . . . influence.”229 This concept of [silent] war was developed
by Kautilya,230 as explained by Boesche: 
[S]ilent war is a kind of fighting that no other thinker I know of has 
discussed. Silent war is a kind of warfare with another kingdom in which the king
and his ministers—and unknowingly, the people—all act publicly as if they were 
at peace with the opposing kingdom, but all the while secret agents and spies
are assassinating important leaders in the other kingdom, creating divisions among
key ministers and classes, and spreading propaganda and disinformation. . . . . In silent
warfare, secrecy is paramount, and . . . the king can prevail only by “maintaining secrecy 
when striking again and again.”231 
Previously, war aimed at gaining  greater visibility of violence and energy, 
but currently the desired outcome is to influence rather than being visible, 
with the defeated target not knowing the fact that it is being attacked, how 
224. Andreas Turunen, in CYBER SECURITY: POWER AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at
99–100. 
225. L. C. Rees, The End of the Rainbow: Implications of 5 GW for a General Theory 
of War, in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 20, 21–22 (Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
226. Id. at 23. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 25. 
























    
 
 
   
 
  











it is being hit or even or that  that the enemy exists.232 In this battle of the
minds, a cyberwar is taking place, turning ordinary people into insurgents
against their own governments through propaganda and misinformation.233 
This tactic creates leaderless resilience comprised of a phantom cell structure
without any headquarters or hierarchical orders; where people within the 
movement have the same general outlook, the  same philosophy,  and where 
they react similarly and target perceived tyrannical state governments.234 
Every independent person has the responsibility of acquiring the skills and 
intelligence to be able to execute a mission by himself, coordinated by an 
emergent network, connected through
[o]rgans of information distribution such as newspapers, leaflets, computers, etc., 
which are widely available to all, keep each person informed of events, allowing
for a planned response that will take many variations. No one need issue an
order . . . . . Those idealist [sic] truly committed to the cause of freedom will act when
they feel when the time is ripe, or will take their cue from others who precede them.235 
According to Beam’s definition, 5GW manipulates the perception of
reality of the adversary, stealing the identity of the adversary and the identity 
of the host in the process, and works on an identity-constructivist framework
of international politics.236 
From a victimized Middle Eastern perspective, within this tactic of
silent warfare, aggressive states first try to install a “puppet leader” in the 
host state if the serving leader is not serving the interest of the established
hegemony. Then, if traditional ways of political diplomacy fail, the aggressive
state fuels rebel and anti-state insurgent sentiments against the sitting 
government. Protests start to erupt, often in the name of fighting corruption,
fighting increased prices and inflation, dictatorship, or religious sentiments. 
Jihadists and terrorist organizations use propaganda in cyberspace to further 
their cause of manufacturing public discourse.237 Propaganda has long been
a tool of rebellion and insurgent warfare.238 Nonstate actors, agents of chaos,
terrorists, foreign infiltrators, and paid mercenaries subsequently use unlawful
force against the state and destroy public property by means of nonpeaceful
protests.239 As in a predicted chess game, the state responds by using legal 
force to disperse these agents in the hope of restoring the peace and the 
232. Id. at 28. 
233. Kohalyk, supra note 176, at 42. 
234.  See id. at 43. 
 235. Id.
 236. Pampinella, supra note 203, at 48. 
237.  Winter & Haid, supra note 56, at 2. 
238.  Id. at 1. 
239. See id. at 2–3. 
212
QURESHI (4TH & 5TH).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2020 3:28 PM         
   
 
   
 
























   
[VOL. 21:  187, 2019] Fourth- and Fifth-Generation Warfare 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
security of the state.240 Collateral damage result from government actions.241 
Media and social media play a negative role in fueling this rebellion against 
the targeted government, by dubbing the state a child killer and by criminalizing 
it because it used force against innocent people while ignoring the fact
that the use of force and chaos were created by the agent(s) of chaos in
the first place.242 Media play on building perspectives of people against
the government, while portraying a positive character of the next “puppet 
leader.”243 The state next loses its public mandate when people start to cheer
for the removal of the current government.244 At the same time, aggressive
foreign powers politically support the chosen candidate. If the sitting 
government refuses to step down, or to kneel down to the regime change 
agendas of foreign aggressors, a civil war or a guerilla starts in the host state
against the government; aggressive foreign states actively and explicitly 
support the rebels with arms, ammunitions, technology, and political backing 
to fight the state by targeting the infrastructure and institutions of their 
own country.245 Syria and Yemen are recent examples of host states victims
of regime change and of the resulting civil wars, where foreign aggressors
have openly supported rebels with arms and finance.246 By contrast, if the
sitting government chooses to step down, the rebellion starts to cool, and 
the aggressor wins a silent war of perception. 
A. Fighting 5GW 
Fighting 5GW can be characterized as counterinsurgency.247 
Counterinsurgency liquidates the ideological and ethnic perceptions created
by 4GW, breaking the social relationship between nonstate actors/insurgents 
and the general public.248 The counterinsurgent must drive societal change, 
target the cultural values of insurgents and the general population,249 fight
on an intellectual level, and deny insurgents an enemy to fight against,250 
240. See generally id.
241.  Id. at 2–3. 
242. Id. 
243. See id.
 244. Id. at 13. 
245. Id. at 13–14. 
246. Id. 
247. Pampinella, supra note 203, at 51. 
248.  Id. at 50. 
249. Id.
250. Id. at 51. 
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rendering it impossible for the public and insurgents to identify the
counterinsurgents’ intentions.251 These tactics form a nonhostile relationship
between counterinsurgents and the people;252 as a result, it protects civilians’
well-being and survival.253 Counterinsurgency creates a safe space, popular 
security and cooperative identities.254 However, paradoxically this
counterinsurgent involvement contributes to the dependence of the 
population on counterinsurgents.255 Therefore, states must instead resist 
this neocolonial Raj of imposed perspectives in shaping ideologies in the 
hopes of resolving all political matters.256 
IV. CONCLUSION
The ways of waging a war are evolving, owing to a decline in the traditional
way of waging wars and the emerging globalization and advancement in
technology and communication.257 Therefore, wars through asymmetric 
means, information, and covert operations are on the rise, with nonstate actors 
being prominent on the battlefield.258 A strategy to counter these new 
generations of warfare is to combine conventional tactics with the new
innovative techniques of DIMEFILCH, and to develop a tight coordination
among military, diplomatic, judicial, and economic institutions, while also
working with foreign counterparts and international institutions.259 More
importantly, we need to change our mindset to be able to counter and
understand the newly emerging threats and their asymmetric purposes.260 
It is imperative to know the enemy and to know ourselves, to understand
why and how the enemy works, and for what purposes.261 
Additionally, a loophole exists in the prohibition on the use of force in 
the UN Charter: following Nicaragua, aggression and use of force now 
include supplying arms and financial support to insurgents, rebels and
other nonstate actors working against the state but to be held accountable,
it has to established that the nonstate actors are under the direct control of 
251. Id.
 252. Id.
 253. Id. at 51–52. 
254. Curtis G. Weeks, Kilcullen narratives on Iraq, in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW 202, 
202–03 (Daniel H. Abbott ed., 2010). 
255. See Weeks, On the Barnettian 5GW, supra note 202, at 209–12. 
256. Gerhard Knaus & Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj, 14 JOURNAL OF
DEMOCRACY 72 (2003). 
257. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 99. 
258. Sudhir, supra note 49, at 58–60; see also NOFI, supra note 1, at 99; Geiß, supra
note 47, at 757–59. 
259. See NOFI, supra note 1, at 93. 
260. NOFI, supra note 1, at 99–100. 
261. NOFI, supra note 1, at 100–01. 
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the state-aggressor, which in practice is hard to do. That loophole is
exploited by aggressive states when they employ hired guns to do the dirty 
work of their political will and leave no fingerprints. Thus, the aggressor
cannot be held liable: they avoid direct engagement262 to circumvent the 
requirements of the international laws of using force.263 
262. Lele, supra note 59, at 98. 
263. Geiß, supra note 47, at 757–59. 
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